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INTRODUCTION
In the 1951 Convention Relating to the 8tatus of
Refugees and Ch. 1967 Protocol, refugees are defined as
"persons compelled to seek asylum abroad 'owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted'" on the basis of
their race, religion, nationality! or political opinion.* 
If individuals qualify for refuges status under this 
definition and are granted that status by the government of 
the state where they are seeking asylum, then the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) must offer 
them protection, give them material assistance! and find 
them a permanent solution.^ This solution can involve 
voluntary repatriation into the country of origin, 
integration into the asylum state, or permanent 
resettlement in a third country. Persons! however, "who 
have committed war crimes, serious non-political crimes, or 
'acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations'" are ineligible for refugee status and the 
benefits that accompany that status.^
Unfortunately, many worthy individuals also do not 
qualify for the status of refugee, firstly, because the 
accepted definition of a refugee does not include 
stipulations for individuals fleeing war, depravity, or 
external aggression and, secondly, because international 
organisation like UNHCR cannot force a government to
1
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recognise *n individual at a refugee. Therefore, 
individuals seeking asylum are only granted the status and 
the rights that the asylum state chooses to grant* Because 
Thailand chose not to recognise the Khmers who crossed the 
Thai border before October of 1979 as refugees* they could 
and did forcibly repatriate them* Between January 7 and 
August 27* 1979, Thailand forcibly repatriated 111*012 of 
the 158*066 Kampucheans who sought asyluui*^ Of those 
remaining* 33*368 returned voluntarily* 3543 were 
resettled* and 7320 were granted asylum pending 
resettlement abroad*^ However* when international 
attention was drawn to the appalling condition of the 
people* coming to the border* Thailand could no longer 
afford to pursue such an unpopular policy* Therefore* 
after international aid agencies* like UMHCR* the World 
Food Program (WFP)* UNICEF* and the International Committee 
of the Bed Cross (1CRC)* guaranteed that they would provide 
the funds* food* supplies* and personnel necessary to care 
for the incoming Thmers* Thailand reversed its policy*
In October of 1979* Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak 
announced that* "Although the Kampuchean people in Thailand 
are regarded as illegal entrants* they will not be pushed 
back*91* With this announcement* Kriangsak 'opened' the 
border* but he opened it to illegal immigrants and 
displaced persons* not to refugees* Only a comparatively 
small number of the Kampucheans entering Thailand would
be granted refugee statue and become eligible for
resettlement abroad* The majority would only be granted
temporary asylum* Their futures would remain undetermined 
and therefore sub
»»3 *
c t to constant manipulat io>i*
the aid to the Rhiners along the
a well- intended and much-ne eded
humanitarian efforts it would degenerate into a program 
where the political interests would supercede the
humanitarian ones •
THE REFUGEES AND THE CAMPS
Hundreds of thousands of Khmer refugees descended 
upon the border in 1979* Some were fleeing hunger and the 
Vietnamese army, some were looking for a better future in 
another place* and others* unfortunately* were forced to go 
to the border by the Khmer Rouge* All of them were 
malnourished; many of them were seriously ill* William 
Shawcross described the state of the Khmers in the 
following terms) "They had malaria* they had tuberculosis* 
the had dysentery* they were famished* they were 
dying***«ln many cases* they were so badly starved that 
their bodies were consuming themselves*"^ The aid 
officials and reporters who visited the border realised 
that* regardless of the political considerations* these 
people desperately needed medical and material assistance* 
First* however* the status of the asylum seekers would have 
to be determined*
Initially* all of the Kampucheans coming to the 
border were defined as illegal immigrants who would be 
given temporary asylum and would be returned to Kampuchea 
when conditions improved* Until such a time* they would be 
held at UNHCR-run holding centers* As Kriangsak originally 
formulated the plan* the Thais would only keep the illegal 
immigrants at the border for a few days* would then move 
them to holding centers further from the border* and would
-4
-5-
finally send them to the largest holding center, 
Khao-I-Dang, which proffered the option to apply for 
refugee status and resettlement abroad.®
Gradually, however, this direct and solution-oriented 
policy gave way as the Thai government began to realize 
that the incoming Khmers were not simply fleeing for 
political reasons but, rather, were looking for food or a 
more secure future in Thailand or a third state. 
Consequently, in February of 1980, Thailand 'closed' the 
border it had opened in 1979 and decided that it would not 
grant any Kampucheans entering after that date refugee
Q
status nor the opportunity to resettle abroad* Hence, 
they would not be allowed into Khao-l-Dang. Now, the only 
way to get into Khao-I-Dang would be to sneak in and, in 
the process, risk being arrested or shot.*® Those Khmers 
already in the camp could remain there as they awaited 
resettlement, but those entering after February would only 
be allowed into Thailand on a temporary basis and would 
have to return to Kampuchea as soon as it was safe.**
Consequently, a number of different classes of 
"refugees," or illegal immigrants, developed. In his 
articles on the refugees in Thailand, Justus M. Van der 
Kroef put the Kampucheans into three basic categories)
1. "Legal" refugees under the administration of 
the Thai Interior Ministry who were eligible for 
resettlement and who numbered 486 in September 1982.
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2. "Kampuchean illegal immigrants under
military detention" who were in UNHCR holding 
centers, who were ineligible for resettlement, who 
were to be repatriated into Kampuchea, and who 
numbered 46,490 in September 1982*
3* Kampuchean displaced persons living in camps 
controlled by resistance groups that were within or 
ju81 across the Thai border who were ineligible for 
resettlement and who numbered 290,000 in 
September 1982*^
As wa8 noted before, however, many of the individuals in 
the second and third categories who were able to get into
Khao-l-J>ang did become eligible for resettlement. The U.S.
alone approved 38,194 Kampucheans in FY1981, 6246 in
FY1982, and 22,399 in FY1983 for refugee status and, 
therefore, for resettlement in the U.S.*^
Khao-l-Dang, especially, and the UNHCR holding 
centers, in general, were al/.o more desirable to the 
refugees because they were more secure, had adequate and 
steady food supplies, provided more medical services, and 
had better facilities than the camps along the border,
which were administered and supplied by 1CRC, UNICEF, and
WFP * When the authors of Wrapped__ in .fche H.iad.f.J..ftluttl
visited the various encampments in 1979 and early 1980, 
they found that Khao-I-Dang, although it was overcrowded, 
had sufficient food supplies and was relatively
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peaceful.*^ Khao-I-Dang also provided the best medical 
services and facilities because doctors and aid personnel 
preferred to work there and because UNHCR was firmly in 
control*^
The holding center at Sa Kaeo also had adequate food 
and water supplies, but it was controlled by the Khmer 
Rouge* Consequently, the atmosphere of the camp was tense 
and more menacing**** A Khmer Rouge cadre named Phak Lim 
and his associates were able to control the distribution of 
food and could police the camp because Thai authorities 
adopted a policy of non-interference* In one instance, 
when some Khmer Rouge put a man in a tank and placed the 
tank over a fire, the Thai soldiers did nothing; an aid 
official had to stop them**^ Because Thailand supported 
the Khmer resistance and because the Khmer Rouge 
constituted the strongest faction within that resistance, 
the Thai military placed the prerogatives of the Khmer 
Rouge above the welfare of the 8a Kaeo residents*
The Thai military even helped, encouraged, and 
sometimes coerced the Kampucheans living in 8a Kaeo and 
Khao-l-Dang to go to the more dangerous camps straddling 
the border* Such a policy achieved two objectives: it 
strengthened and provided recruits for Son Sann'a KPNLF, 
Sihanouk's Moulinaka, and leng Sary's Khmer Rouge, and it 
got the Khmers out of Thai territory* In addition, the 
presence of large numbers of civilian Khmers, resistance
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fighters, aid workers, and U.N. personnel along the 
vulnerable plains area of the border served as a strategic 
buffer between Thailand and its historical nemesis, 
Vietnam.*® Since Kampuchea could no longer serve in that 
capacity i the Kampucheans would have to serve in its place.
The Thai military used a number of tactics to 
"encourage" Khmers to go to the border. Soldiers
distributed leaflets that urged people to go back and fight 
for their country and circulated rumors that people would 
be forced to go.*^ Pursuing a more active policy» they
began moving Khmers from the holding centers to the border
2 0after dark» when the aid workers were not present. 
Consequently, no one could tell if the residents had gone 
voluntarily or if they had been forced to go. Although 
many individuals suspected that not all had gone willingly, 
they could get no hard evidence to substantiate their 
claims•
When UNHCR discovered these nocturnal transfers, it 
attempted to exert some control over the repatriation 
process. UNHCR officials negotiated with the Thai
government and got the Thais to agree that the Khmers would 
be moved during the day and that they would be able to 
choose the part of the border and, hence, the resistance 
camp to which they would go.^* In addition, all persons 
who chose to leave would have to meet with a UNHCR official 
and sign a document which stated that they were returning
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of their own free will.^2 This procedure achieved its 
objective; it curbed the number of people who "chose1' to 
leave* And, it could be legitimised because, technically, 
the Khmers were only being "relocated" to the border and 
were not being repatriated into Kampuchea* ICRC and 
UNICEF, who would have to take care of the new arrivals on 
the border and who knew of the dangers that existed there, 
attacked UNHCR for becoming involved in the process. 23 
The process itself, however, was not internationally 
condemned because other states, particularly the U*8* and 
China, also wanted to build up the border* Given such 
attitudes, it is not surprising that even this limited 
attempt at control was soon abandoned and that nighttime 
relocations were allowed to resume*
The Kampucheans who returned to the border area, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, were confronted with much 
more insecure conditions* ICRC, WFP, and UNICEF only 
provided the supplies and medical services for the camps 
along the border; the Thai military actually delivered the 
aid* This "delivery," in turn, consisted of simply handing 
over the food to the resistance leaders in control of the 
camps who were supposed to give the food only to the 
designated recipients, civilians, and not to soldiers* 
Unfortunately, because the border area was so dangerous, 
the aid personnel could not remain in the camps after dark 
to oversee how the aid was dispensed and to ensure that
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no aid was diverted. Hence* the aid organisations had 
little or no control over how the aid was distributed.
The resistance groups were able to benefit from and 
abuse this method of distribution in three ways* all of 
which were detrimental to the civilians under their 
control. Firstly* they were able to get the food aid which 
allowed them to survive and to continue to fight only 
because they had the civilian Rhmere under their control. 
U.N. aid organisations are not allowed to give aid to 
soldiers. Secondly* the camp leaders were essentially only 
able to control the civilians in their camps because they 
controlled the food supply. They could refuse to feed the 
people who did not support the cause and couli' give more to 
the soldiers and people who did. Thirdly* they could sell 
the food aid they received* either to the people they were 
supposed to give it to or to other parties* and* in turn* 
could use the money to buy weapons which would inctcaee 
their fighting ability and their control over the camp 
residents•^
Mak Moun, the largest border encampment in 1979* was 
graphically described in the following termst
Pile. of melon skins * chicken bones * beer bottles*
empty tin cans* (and) plastic bags lay over the
ground. A stream running through them.. .contained 
only a foul-smelling slick of sewage. (It was) an 
unsettling limbo of poverty* extortion* and menace*
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where murders were rife and the threat of artillery
attack by Vietnamese or Thai troops was constant*^
In border camps like Mak Moun, there was less of a concern
for sanitation because the border camps were inherently
unstable* People in the camps were armed and fought
amongst themselves, as well as against the forces of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and the People's
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). In 1979, at Mak Moun, for
example, two groups fought because one wanted to stay in
Kampuchea and fight, while the other wanted to go to the
holding centers in Thailand*^ When such fighting
occurred, camp facilities could be damaged, and aid
distribution could be disrupted* The Khmtrs, consequently,
had no sense of permanence or security*
The Kampucheans, in addition, were mistreated by
their own "leaders," by their fellow resistance fighters,
and even by the Thai military, which was supposed to
protect them* In a 1985 letter, Thomas Hammarberg, the
Secretary General of Amnesty International, accused Son
Sann and the KPMLF of carrying out "long detentions and
arbitrary executions" at their border camps*^ Hammarberg
specified that individuals were executed without trial when
2 Sthey were charged with rape, espionage, or desertion* 
The Thai military acted in a comparably brutal manner when 
it shelled a camp and killed 100 Khmers after a Thai 
soldier had been murdered by the residents for raping a
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refugee wonan.29 Xh« Thai nilitary and tha raaiatanca 
force* also worked together against the refugsao* In 
October of 1984, when 528 Khners asked Thailand to give 
then sanctuary because they were being nistreated by the 
Rhaer Rouge and had had their food rations cut in half, the 
Thais refused.30 Th<y ,*id that Thailand no longer gave 
the Khners refuge.3* Yet, when Ranpuchaan civilians and 
soldiers were attacked by 8RV and PER troops, Thailand was 
willing to give then tenporary refuge.
The illegal innigrants along the border, then, were 
the people who paid the price necessary to build up tha 
resistance forces. They provided the nanpower, the food, 
the nodical supplies, and even the funds needed to buy the 
arns which enabled the resistance groups to continue their 
attacks against the PER and, hence, to keep the Xhner 
refugees on the border, the refugees, in affect, beeane a 
hunan buffer. They were sandwiched between the fighting 
forces of the resistance groups supported by Thailand, nost 
of the Western states, the ABRAM states, and China, on the 
one hand, and the Vietnaaese-baeked PRK forces, on the 
other. They were there because China, Thailand, and nost 
of the non-Connunist countries wanted then to be there and 
allowed then to be coerced into noving there, regardless of 
whether the condition* on the border were safe or 
haaardous.
AID AND P0LITXC8
The PRK end the 8RV objected to the XCRC end UNXCBF 
eid to the border* They perceived thet eid to the border 
wee simply e camouflage for eid to the reaietence group#, 
end, elthough thia wee not' the explicit purpoee of the eid, 
the reaietence groupe undoubtedly benefitted from the eid 
program* lnitielly, the PRK refused to let XCRC end UNXCBF 
operete end dietribute eid within Kempuchee if they 
distributed eid elong the border ee well* Theilend, in 
turn, would only ellow eid to be flown from Bangkok to 
Phnom Penh if eid were given to the refugees on the 
border* The internetionel eid orgenisetions theaselvee 
were obligeted to give eid to both aides* NTo deny eid to 
people on the border would be to deny the principles of 
iapertielity end non-discriainetion on which the 
orgenisetions were founded*"^*
loth sides hed to be fed, end, elthough it continued 
to condean the eid to the border, the PRK eventuelly ceded 
this point* UNXCBF end XCRC hed to give eid to the Khaers 
on the border, regerdless of politics, because they were in 
e dire state end, as importantly, because the border was 
extremely visible* Reporters could easily get to the 
border; aost could not get inside Kampuchea* Xn addition, 
because the distribution of food inside Kampuchea was so 
inefficient, an alternative source elong the border
3 ••
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had to be provided. U.8. Ambassador Abramowits openly
favored using food as a magnet to draw people to the 
border* even though he was aware that such a policy would 
lead to long-term problems* because he saw no other means 
to get the food to the people*33 The border was the only 
viable way to channel the aid into Kampuchea because the 
PRK would not cooperate with the aid organisations to the 
extent necessary*
To make full use of thin venue* the aid organisations
developed a "land bridge*113* Food and seed were
distributed at the relatively secure Nong Chan camp to
non-refugees who came from inside Kampuchea and who
intended to return to their homes* By the end of 1980 *
146*500 tons of rice had been distributed over the
bridge *33 it was a successful and constructive means to
aid the Kampuchean people• Thla food and aaad network
allowed the Khmers to remain in Kampuchea and yet still
receive aid; they did not have to join the morass on the 
border in order to get the food necessary to survive* 
Because it was beneficial* even the Vietnamese soldiers 
guarding the border were willing to tolerate it*
Unfortunately* political disputes would disrupt the 
bridge a number of times* In December 1979* Van 8aren led 
the Khmer Serei of Mak Mown in an attack against Kong Chan* 
The free rice that was being distributed there reduced the 
amount of money he earned selling his food aid and
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diminished the control hie monopoly on food gave him over 
others. in another instance* when the Thai government 
decided to replace the border commander* Colonel Prachak* 
with Task Force 30* Prachak unilaterally decided to close 
the land bridge.^? He did not want to lose the enormous 
profits nor the substantial power he derived from his 
control over the border and the aid distributed there* His 
personal gain was more important than the welfare of the 
aid recipients.
The Thai military, in general* did not make a great 
effort to distribute the aid fairly and efficiently. When 
WFP gave the soldiers the aid to distribute to the refugees 
in the unsecured camps which were inaccessible to 1CRC and 
UNICEF* the Thais gave the aid directly to the leaders of 
the various resistant forces. In some of these camps* at 
least 30X of the aid went directly to Khmer Rouge 
s o l d i e r s . W h e n  UNICEF attempted to control how the food 
was being distributed by going to the camps itself and 
giving only two rations to each woman over ten* one fcr 
herself and one for her child* the Thai military sent 
trucks of food to the leaders of the camps to compensate 
for the drop in food supplies.If UNICBY would not give 
the aid to the resistance fighters* they would.
By 1981* both UNICEF and ICBC were fed up with the 
conditions on the border. The Thai military would not 
provide adequate security* so they could not monitor how
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the food aid was distributed. More importantly, they were 
operating outside of their mandates because they were 
feeding soldiers. Particularly distasteful was their 
feeding of the Khmer Rouge who, in addition to being armed 
soldiers, had unquestionably committed crimes against 
humanity. UNICEF and 1CRC consequently decided that they
wanted to withdraw from the border and that they wanted
UNHCR and WFP to take over. In 1981 , they both took a
stand. They refused to deliver food to the Khmer Rouge 
camps and also refused to deliver food to certain Khmer 
Serei camps unless the Thais provided better security.^ 
The U.N. was able to force UNICEF to continue to supply the 
Khmer Rouge and Khmer Eerei camps, but 1CRC, which is an 
independent U.N. affiliate, was able to withdraw from its 
border duties. In 1982, UNICEF was also allowed to 
relinquish its border operations to the newly developed 
U.N. Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) which was a U.N. body 
centered around the WFP.
The UNHCR had originally stated that it would be 
willing to work with WFP and would assume responsibility 
for the border operation, but it ultimately chose to use
M the imprecision of the border as an excuse not to go
there."41 Because the border was not clearly delineated,
UNHCR could not be certain that the Kampucheans had
actually left Kampuchea and, therefore, could not consider 
them refugees. In reality, UNHCR probably refused to
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assume the responsibility because the border area was too 
dangerous and because UNHCR officials recognised that it 
was unproductive to keep drawing the people to the border 
when they had virtually no prospects for future 
resettlement. By not going to the border, however, UNHCR 
Mreduced the protection that was offered to the people on 
the border, many of whom certainly qualified as genuine 
r e f u g e e s •
This was simply another manifestation of the dilemma 
which the aid organizations on the border faced. Was it 
more important to feed the needy Khmers or to remain within 
their mandates? Ultimately, the donor governments and aid 
organizations decided that it was more important to feed 
the Khmer people, even if they had not properly left 
Kampuchea and even if feeding them meant that the 
resistance fighters were fed as well. After all, evidence 
suggested that some of the aid being distributed within 
Kampuchea was going to feed the PRK and SRV troops. In one 
eyewitness account, an aid official working inside 
Kampuchea saw WFP aid being loaded onto Vietnamese military 
vehicles.^ if the Vietnamese could do it, then the Thais 
could do it. There was no need to institute a double 
standard, even if the feeding of the Khmer Rouge was 
morally abhorrent.
However, to many, including the Thais and the 
Chinese, feeding the Khmer Rouge was not only acceptable,
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it was desirable* The Khmer Rouge comprised the largest 
and most well-organized faction of the Coalition Government 
for Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)* In 1984, it was estimated 
that the Khmer Rouge numbered 35,000, while the KPNLF and 
Moulinaka forces together numbered only 25,000.^ In a 
sense, the formation of the coalition was simply a means to 
make the Khmer Rouge more acceptable* The CGDK has never 
been a cohesive fighting nor diplomatic force* It has 
usually had a difficult time even projecting an image of 
unity* China, unlike most other states, openly supports 
the Khmer Rouge* With the acquiescence of, if not actual 
aid from, the Thai military, it sends arms to the Khmer 
Rouge, along with smaller shipments to the other members of 
the coalition*^ Other states, like Singapore, sell or 
give arms to the non-Communist elements of the CGDK*^
Certainly, then, the border camps which the U*N* 
organisations and other international aid groups provide 
aid to are sanctuaries for insurgents* The civilian 
populations are being fed, but so are the rebels that are 
engaged in guerrilla warfare against the PRK* 
Consequently, although these people are fed, they are also 
caught between the SRV and PRK armies, on one side, and the 
Khmer resistance forces, on the other* Thailand and other 
states may slander the 8RV and PRK forces for killing 
Innocent people, but they are the ones who put the innocent
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wit h the guilty* They made the border the only means to 
repatriate into Kampuchea* When UHHCR official Zia Risvi 
suggested that they should negotiate with the PRK 
so that people wishing to return could be sent back by 
plane or boat» rather than along the dangerous border 
route, his proposal was not even seriously considered*^ 
Such a step would have required the tacit recognition of 
the PRK as a legitimate governing power, and this was 
politically unacceptable* Even Risvi's proposal to send 
"returnee kits" to Phnom Penh for refugees who had 
permanently returned to the interior was considered 
unacceptable because it might improve the image of the PRK, 
which would distribute the kits
The refugees who wanted to return to Kampuchea would 
instead have to cross the border along paths that had been 
cleared of mines and led to "safe" sones or, in other 
words, resistance camps* Many more would be forced to 
return* In May of 1983, 20,000 were sent back, and, in June 
of 1985, Prasong announced that he planned to repatriate 
"as many as possible of the 230,000 Khmer civilians housed 
at evacuation sites along the border to 'safe areas" inside 
Kampuchea*"^ Even persons who had been accepted for 
resettlement could be sent to the border* In March 1984, 
300 refugees were moved from a transit center to the border 
because the Thais felt that they were wasting too much 
space and too many officials taking care of the refugees
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awaiting final clearance#^®
Finally» in January of 1987 » Thai1, m d  decided to 
cloae the laat remaining holding center and formal avenue 
for reaettlementi Khao-l-Dang. All the residents of 
Khao-I-Dang will now be moved to the border# The 15|000 of 
the 22»134 inhabitant 9 of the camp who have refugee status 
will lose that statusi although they will still technically 
be eligible for resettlement in third states#*** The 
relocation of these refugees began in early March as 230 
were moved to the resistance camps they chose along the 
border#"*^ When the relocation is completed! only one 
category of "refugees'* will really be lef t--displaced 
Kampucheans living on or astride the Thai-Kampuchean border 
with little or no opportunity for resettlement#
The only sanctuary which would now be offered to the 
Khmers would be tenuous and temporary# If the Thai 
government determined that the Kampucheans along the border 
were going to be endangered by a Vietnamese offensive! they 
would grant them temporary asylum and would move them to 
evacuation sites deeper inside the Thai border# The 
problem with this policy would be that the Thais would 
arbitrarily decide when the conditions were severe enough 
to warrant granting temporary asylum# In April 1983! when 
24!000 people tried to evacuate a KPHLF camp at Prey Chan 
after it was shelled during an engagement near the camp and 
after one person was killed and six were injured9 the Thai
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mil itary turned them back because they did not feel that
the danger was 1 imm i nent•M^  A few days later, the camp
was evacuated because the Vietnamese had overrun the camp
and shells had fallen in Thai territory*^ In this case,
as in most cases, the Tha is tried to put the relocat ions
of f un ti 1 the last moment • Yet, the evacuations were
frequent * Dur ing a two-d ay period in March 1985 alone,
three separ ate groups of people, totalling 86,140, had to
be <evacuated .55
Not only, then, were the Kampucheans forced to 1 ive
in insecure 1camps contro lied by oftentimes cruel and
corrupt resistance groups, they were also subjected to 
frequent and risky evacuations* They did not know when or 
whether they would get food nor where they would be from 
one day to the next* When the refugees were evacuated, a 
new "home11 consisted of Nlittle more than a blue plastic 
sheet and a blanket providing a roof and some protection 
from the sun*"** Under the new policy, the Khmer 
civilians were there when the soldiers needed them, but 
they were not a liability when the soldiers had to fight* 
Because Thailand and UNBRO evacuated their supporters, the 
soldiers did not have to worry about protecting anyone* In 
addition, if the situation became hopeless, the fighters 
themselves could drop their arms and cross the border*
The Thai government thus made the fighting relatively
lwaypainless and less costly* The y out, so
the Khmer resistance had little to loae by continuing to 
fight* which is what the U*8** Thailand* and China wanted* 
The welfare of the refugees was secondary when it came to
waging a war of attrition against the Vietnamese-backed 
PRK •
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INTERNATIONAL INCONSTANCY
Such developments have been possible over time 
because international attention turned away from 
Kampuchea and the Kampuchean refugee situation* In the 
1980 's, international concern began to center on the 
Mid-East, international terrorism, end the plight of the 
Ethiopians* As a result, the Thais and the donor 
governments have not had to constantly worry about 
generating unfavorable press and have had more room to 
maneuver* Political, and not humanitarian, concerns could 
be the final arbiters of policy.
An obvious reflection of this decline in concern 
about the Kampuchsans has been the decline in monetary 
pledgee to aid organisations for the Kampuchean relief 
operation* In 1979, donor states pledged approximately 
$210 million, and, over the next two years, the aid 
organisations spent approximately $600 million**? Prom 
1982 to 1983, the C*N* agencies and 1CRC spent only about 
$160 Billion.58 Ih* donation* froa the U.S. dropped in a 
aiailar but nor* draatic faahion. Nbila tha U.S. donated 
$129.9 aillion for Khaar reliaf in FY1980 , in FY1982, it 
donated only $17.16 Billion, and in FY1983, only $15.79 
Billion.'** A drop in aid we* to be expected aa tha nunber 
of refuse** on th* border dropptd ft#n t toun i 600,000 to 
around 260,000, but th* decline in interest also
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contributed* Inside Kampuchea, a substantial amount of aid 
was still necessary if Kampuchea was to be able to rebuild* 
l)nfortunately> the Western donor countries actively 
opposed providing developmental aid to supplement the 
relief aid* They were willing to help the Khmers inside 
the PRK and on the border survive the threat of famine, but 
they were not willing to fund the aid projects oriented 
toward developing agricultures educations and industry that 
would improve their lives because doing so might strengthen 
the Vietnamese-backed Heng 8amrin government* Hence, the 
aid organisations could ship in water and rice, but they 
could not invest donated funds in much-needed improvements 
for the irrigation system, nor in the restoration of the 
essential eleotrical and water systems*60 Even 
developmentally-oriented gifts from private organisations 
were restricted by some governments* When the Mennonite 
Central Committee tried to get an export permit to ship 
pencils and paper to Kampuchea, the U*S. would not give 
them one because they felt that if the PRK handed out these 
supplies, their image might improve*61 it seems that 
weakening the PRK government took precedence over making 
the country livable again*
There is, it oust br noted, a blatant contradiction 
between the policies the donor nations were pursuing within 
Kampuchea e.ad the policies they were pursuing on the 
border* Thailand and the aid organisations have said that
25-
their goal is to repatriate the remaining Kampucheans, and 
yet they have not taken the developmental steps necessary 
to create a stable country to which they could return* 
Because the majority of the big donors oppose the PRK 
regime, they have been willing to absorb the monetary and 
human costs of keeping the Kampucheans on the border and 
denying them a viable alternative* Consequently, the 
Khmers have been forced to stay in a region which Van der 
Kroef described in the following terms:
Governed by self-proclaimed 'national liberation" 
leaders and their well-armed bands of bodyguards, the 
teeming, hunger-driven refugee mass along, if not 
straddling the ill-defined border•*•(was) a readily 
protective environment for smugglers (including 
weapons runners), blaokmarket operators with 
connections among corrupt officials in the Thai 
border communities nearby, 'recruiters' for both 
Pol Pot guerrillas and their anti-Communist rivals, 
Vietnamese and Thai intelligence personnel, and so 
on.^1
It seems that the semi-permanent community on the border 
developed a political dynamic of its own with conflict at 
its center*
Although nono of the Khmers were living under optimal 
conditions, the quality of their lives did differ 
significantly according to where they were because their
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location determined how much aid they received: those at 
Khao-I-Dang received more than those on the border* those 
on the border received more than those in Kampuchea* and 
those in Kampuchea received more than those in Vietnam and 
Laos*63 The aid was given to those to whom it was most 
convenient to give and to those to whom it was most 
politically acceptable and profitable to give* The 
residents of Khao-l-Dang were predominantly middle-class* 
were more oriented toward Western values* and were not 
Khmer Rouge* so aid personnel preferred to work there. The 
border region was highly visible* so international 
organizations made a greater effort to improve conditions 
there. Because they were relatively invisible* refugees in 
Vietnam and Laos received less aid from the West.
In addition* those in Vietnam and Laos have 
essentially been unable to resettle in countries outside 
the Soviet bloc. For the refugees in Thailand and along 
the border * however» the opportunities to resettle have 
also been less that optimal. Between 1981 and 1964* the 
U.S. consistently granted refugee status to fewer 
Kampucheans than Vietnamese. In FY1981* when the greatest 
number of Khmers were given refugee status* only 38*194 
received it* as compared to 65*279 VietnameseOverall* 
the U.S. Immigration and naturalisation Service grauted 
refugee status to 176*097 Vietnamese* as compared to only 
97*092 Kampucheans
-27-
This difference it due primarily to a number of 
political and economic factors* The majority of the 
Vietnamese who left the country after 1980 were ethnic 
Chinese* These Hboat people," who endured depravity and 
danger to sail from Vietnam to Thailand, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Malaysia, captured the world's attention* All of 
these governments, and particularly the last three, were 
reluctant to accept the refugees and would only allow them 
into their ports if third states agreed to process them 
swiftly for resettlement* As a result, the boat people 
were resettled in a number of months, while the Kampucheans 
often had to wait years or were never even given the 
opportunity.66 Third states were only willing to take a 
certain number of Indochinese refugees, and the political 
pressure to take the Vietnamese boat people was greater 
because, if they were not taken, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Malaysia might have turned away future 
refugees to die at sea*
It is also true that the ethnic Chinese coming out of 
Vietnam made more desirable refugees* In general, they had 
more money than their Khmer counterparts, a better 
education, more useful employment skills, and more family 
connections abroad* Most Khmers were farmers who had 
little or no education*6? This is especially true of the 
children who grew up during the Pol Pot era because 
education was not provided and only the moat primitive
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agricultural practices were permitted.68 The Vietnamese 
boat people, then, were more politically acceptable because 
they could be more easily integrated into society and were 
more economically acceptable because their integration 
would probably require fewer tax dollars.
Since 1985, the prospects for resettlement have 
declined further. Between January and March of 1985, a 
sisable number of Kampucheans, 5042, left for third
countries, but, in the Hqgld__Kmfngftg Itporti fiapfcambiU
1985 . it was projected that 15,000 to 17 ,000 of the 
remaining 26,907 refugees at Khao-l-Dang would not qualify 
to be r e s e t t l e d . ^  $5% 0f the residents had already been 
there for four years without being accepted.^® Por the 
Kampucheans that remained on the border, the chances of
being resettled were even slimmer unless they had relatives 
in other countries who were willing to work through the
extensive red tape necessary to get them out. Of the
estimated 253,404 Kampucheans on the border in May 1986,
third countries agreed to take only 1051 • ^ ^
When the relocation of the Khao-l-Dang residents is 
completed, there will be no more official refugees in 
Thailand. Mow, Khmers who want to resettle will have to 
apply to different governments on an individual basis for 
acceptance as an immigrant or refugee. They will no longeri —
be able to work through the channels provided by UMHCft at 
Khao-l-Dang* While this policy technically leaves the door
ii4
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open for resettlement; in reality, it will be of little use 
to the Khmer** Host of the inhabitants of Khao-I-Dang have 
already been interviewed by different governments and were 
found to be unacceptable, according to Western diplomats, 
because "they either lacked skills, had no family 
connections abroad or were considered politically 
unacceptable—in a word, followers of the Khmer Rouge."7  ^
If residents of Khao-l-Dang, who were mostly middle-class 
and more oriented toward Western values, were found to be 
unacceptable, then the Khmers on the border, who are 
predominantly middle or lower-class and are associated with
the resistance groups and, hence , th. Khmer Rouge, ere even
more likely to be found unacceptable• Unfortunately, the
outlook is even grimmer if v. consider the fact that the
U.8. , which has accepted th* most Khmer refugees in the
past, has been accused by relief workers of being "unduly 
strict in reviewing applications for both refugees and 
immigranta, often rejecting applicationa over 
technicalities or asking for documents that are impossible 
to get."7*
It would appear that the Western countries are 
getting, what one Thai critic terms, "compassion 
fatigue."7* Between 1975 and September 1915, the U.8. 
alone resettled 760,584 Indochinese refugees.7* By 
December 31, 1985, franca had resettled 110,961 Indochinese 
refugees.7* As the economies in the Western countries
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have declined over time, many people are probably beginning 
to resent the refugees and the aid they receive* Because 
the plight of the Kampucheans and other Indochinese 
refugees is no longer in the headlines, most people are not 
aware of the problems they still face* It has therefore 
become politically disadvantageous, in some countries, to 
accept the Indochinese refugees*
OTHER ALTERNATIVES
What other alternatives, then, do the Khmers have? 
One alternative, although it is not a possible choice for 
most, is to permanently settle in Thailand* This, unless 
done surreptitiously, would require Thai approval, and the 
Thais have usually been unwilling to give that approval* 
In the past, Thailand has had serious problems with its 
indigenous Communist party, and it fears that the Khmers 
will aid or join the Communist party or, at minimum, that 
they will make the border areas, which are already "fercile 
grounds for insurgents," even more fertile*?? Even if 
they did not support the Thai Communist Party, they would 
put added strain on Thailand's economic, agricultural, 
medical, and educational resources* This could lead to 
dissatisfaction among the Thais in the affected areas, who, 
in turn, could become a political liability* In other 
words, permanently settled Khmers would make too many 
demands on a government that is already stretching its 
limits•
There was, however, one case where the Thai 
government "decided in principle to grant citisenship to 
group of more than 900 refugees" living near the former 
holding center at Rap Cherng*?® This group, ns might be 
expected, was an exceptionsl one* Most of them were ethnic 
Thais or descendants of ethnic Thais who had lived in
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Kampuchea and claimed that "their tie* to Thailand 
compelled them to leave KampucheeM after 1 975*^^ They 
were Thais, and the Khmer Rouge was known to abuse 
non-Khmers. The final decision on their status will be 
made in mid-1980, after their cases ere reviewed. Ve^y few 
of the Kampuchean refugees, however, can expect to be 
treated similarly. Thailand simply does not want them.
The only other alternative for the Kampucheans--the 
one which is favored by Thailand, the donor states, and the 
aid oiganisations--is to voluntarily repatriate. 
Unfortunately, the 8RV and the PR* do not approve of this 
alternative. They do not want individuals who are hostile
toward their government to return to the country.
Therefore, they view the repatriation policy as an attempt 
to destabilise the PRK , and, given the Thai policy of 
placing the refugees under the control of the rebels, this 
view is justified. The Vietnamese mode their
dissatisfaction known, Shawcross aooorted, on July 22 and 
23, 1980, when, after the Thais beg«n "encouraging" people
in the holding camps to go back to the border, they
go
attacked some Khmer Serei camps north of Aranyaprathet•
Large-scale and cooperative repatriation, then, is 
not a viable alternative for the Khmers. Por an orderly 
and coordinated process of return to take place, the Thais 
and the Western donor states would have to be willing to 
work with the PRK, which they are not, and the PRK would
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have to be willing to accept the refugees* which it is 
not* The Thais* the Chinese* and the Americans do not want 
to recognize the PRK regime; the Vietnamese and the PRK do 
not want to have to contend with any opposition groups. 
Therefore* the only real “al terna t i ve" which the Khmers now 
have is to remain where they are--sandwiched between the 
resistance forces of the CGDK and the armies of the SRV and 
the PRK—until a political settlement based on political 
concerns is achieved.
In the meantime* the Khmers' lives are put on hold* 
and they are growing increasingly more dependent upon the 
aid agencies. As W.R. Smyser* a UNHCR official, aptly sums 
up the tragedy of their condition* “Refugees can suffer 
deeply from prolonged dependency•••(and they can) pass to 
the invisible emergency of stagnation.
CONCLUSIONS
Unfortunatelyi it ia doubtful that things could have 
turned out differently* Although it is not often openly 
admitted by donor states, humanitarian aid is bound up 
inextricably with politics* Initially, countries react to 
emergencies with vigor and the best of intentions* But, as 
urgency recedes and the reporters go on to other stories, 
good intentions are supplanted by political concerns* 
Although a genuine effort is made to help people in need, 
donor states are fickle* They offer aid and sanctuary when 
it is in theix interest to do so, but they try to shun or 
reduce their obligations when it is not*
However, even if we are forced to operate under the 
assumption that states only act in their own self-interest, 
the Kampuchean relief program could have been improved* It 
would have been more constructive to concentrate on 
improving conditions inside Kampuchea, rather than on the 
border* Many of the Kampucheans came to the border because 
they had no other choice; they could not find food inside 
Kampuchea* However, for an intensive effort to have been 
successful, the 8KV and the P&K would have had to have been 
willing to fully cooperate* 8uch a project would have 
required the admission of a substantial number of foreign 
aid workers and doctors, as well as a lot of support 
personnel, like nurses and dockworkers* These workers, in
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addition < ’ la have required a good deal of freedom to 
operate effectively*
Unfortunately, the SRV and the PRK were not willing 
to tolerate a large contingent of foreign aid personnel. 
At first, only doctors and nurses from the Soviet bloc were 
allowed into Kampuchea, and, later, only a few 
non-Communist doctors were allowed to join the effort. The 
aid organizations were never able to bring in the support 
personnel necessary to distribute and administrate the aid 
effectively, and those that were allowed in were severely 
restricted in where they could go and what they could do. 
The aid groups could not even establish a radio link with 
Bangkok, even if they allowed the PRK to monitor all the 
transmissions. They had to communicate through letters 
sent on the aid planes going to and from Bangkok. Hence, 
their job was made very difficult.
Although the reluctance on the part of the 8RV and 
the PRK tr accept and trust Western aid personnel is 
understandable given the Indochinese experience with 
Western interference in their domestic affairs, it would 
have been to their benefit to put aside their reservations 
and cooperate fully with the aid organisations. If they 
had done so, their international, as well as their 
domestic, image would have been improved. In Kampuchea, as 
on the border, food was power; it could win support. A 
stronger country with a more satisfied population would
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also have been better able to fight the resistance groups 
and would have appeared more attractive to the Khmer 
refugees on the border who wanted to return to Kampuchea* 
even if it was controlled by the Vietnamese* By not fully 
cooperating with the aid organizations operating in Phnom 
Penh* Vietnam lost an opportunity to reduce its liabilities 
and responsibilities in Kampuchea and suffered yet another 
blow to its international image*
It seems that all of the parties directly involved in 
the conflict--the Thais* the Vietnamese* the PRK* and the 
Khmer refugees--have lost* Thailand is stuck with a 
cumbersome and provocative population on its border with 
Kampuchea* The Vietnamese are bogged down in a costly and 
never-ending conflict with the Khmer resistance which they 
cannot afford* given their domestic economic problems and 
their growing dependence on the Soviet Union* The PRK has 
virtually no legitimacy outside the Soviet bloc because it 
is viewed as a Vietnamese puppet and will not seek a 
compromise with any element of the CGDK* The real losers* 
however* are the Khmer refugees* They are caught in the 
middle of this political impasse with no real alternatives* 
Given this conclusion* it is essential to question 
whether relief aid "really alleviates their (the refugees') 
condition as much as it assuages our consciences* or 
whether i t  sometimes a c t u a l l y  r e i n f o r c e s  the und er ly in g  
causes  of  t h e i r  d e s p a i r * " * 2 The r e l i e f  aid to Kampuchea*
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it would appear, did more to soothe the collective Western 
conscience than it did to allev te the causes of their 
suffering* The majority of the Khmer refugees are still in 
temporary encampments along the militarily volatile border, 
and many of them are still under the power of their former 
despotic rulers, the Khmer Rouge* We did not give them 
sanctuary, we gave them a front-row seat to prolonged 
political conflict*
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